---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: S. Kalyanaraman <kalyan97@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 4:34 AM
Subject: Are EVMs the new danger to democracy? -- Sandhya Jain
To:
From: S. Kalyanaraman <kalyan97@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 4:34 AM
Subject: Are EVMs the new danger to democracy? -- Sandhya Jain
To:
http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2013/08/are-evms-new-danger-to-democracy.html
Should India go to the 2014 General Election with the old paper ballots, or should it trust its luck with the new age voting machines? The question assumes urgency in the wake of serious lacunas that have come to light vis-à-vis the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) that were supposed to make it easier and quicker to count the votes, but have now put country's reputation as a raucous democracy with the ability to conduct free and fair elections under a cloud.
--
S. Kalyanaraman
See: http://government.wikia.com/wiki/Review_the_2009_Lok_Sabha_Election_Process:_Promises_and_Reality This explains the happenings of Lok Sabha 2009 polls using EVMs.
Are EVMs the new danger to democracy?
By Sandhya Jain on August 20, 2013
Should India go to the 2014 General Election with the old paper ballots, or should it trust its luck with the new age voting machines? The question assumes urgency in the wake of serious lacunas that have come to light vis-à-vis the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) that were supposed to make it easier and quicker to count the votes, but have now put country's reputation as a raucous democracy with the ability to conduct free and fair elections under a cloud.Way back in 2009, when farsighted individuals pointed to the possibility of rigging through the EVMs, they were greeted with skepticism because of the credibility of the Election Commission. But the critics convincingly demonstrated their claims. Now, however, the remedial paper trail – which is to be tested in Nagaland next month – is casting fresh doubts about the integrity of the electoral process. Under the experimental new voter Verifiable Paper Trail (VVPAT), a ballot slip containing the serial number and symbol of the candidate voted for via the EVM will be printed and made visible to the voter for a brief five seconds after which it will fall into a compartment.
This will allow for physical verification of the tally in the event of a dispute. In this manner, the number of votes cast via each machine, and per candidate break up can be physically checked. The feedback from Nagaland will determine whether the system should be expanded, in phases, to cover the rest of the country. This could involve a massive additional outlay of Rs 8000 – 10,000 crore, and may not be possible to implement before the next elections.
But there are many lacunas with the paper trail. To begin with, seven out of 11 lakh of the existing EVMs are not compatible with a printing unit, besides which there are many snags with printers. The Election Commission views printers as impractical because they are bulky to transport, have problems of jamming and ink running out, and involve a 'start up time' with each usage which could cause delays in the voting process itself. Maintaining and servicing printers during elections could be a huge headache. A second option is to junk the existing EVMs and buy new EVMs with an in-built paper trail, but this would be impossible before the 2014 General Election.
Whatever system is adopted, the EVM paper trail backup works only where a particular election is contested, and it is the discretion of the election officer to decide whether or not to grant the paper count. So if the election software is manipulated in machines spread out all over the country to give the impression of an underlying 'wave' in favour of a particular party, an aggrieved candidate could feel it futile to challenge the result in a particular constituency.
Alternately, rigged constituencies may not get challenged at all. The paper trail makes sense only if it is mandatorily checked in each and every constituency, in which case, it makes better sense to return to the ballot paper and junk the EVMs as a bad experiment. This is what Ireland did in 2009, just three years after launching e-voting machines at a cost of 51 million Euros, because voters did not trust the machines as they knew that computers can be hacked. A faulty or rigged voting machine would deliver a silent e-coup d'etat.
Former Union Law Minister Subramanian Swamy was the first to challenge the infallibility of the EVMs after a high profile candidate 'lost' and then 'won' in 2009. This single incident convinced many that EVMs were open to fraud and manipulation. Dr Swamy was also influenced by a series of articles in reputed computer engineering journals, which questioned the integrity of EVMs. Most articles called for a minimum of nine safeguards, none of which exist in the Indian EVMs.
E-voting is widely distrusted. In March 2008, Germany's Supreme Court ruled that e-voting was unconstitutional because the average citizen could not be expected to understand the process of recording and tallying votes. Indeed, in October 2006, Dutch public-interest group 'Wij Vertrouwen Stemcomputers Niet' ('We Do Not Trust Voting Machines') proved the machines could be hacked in just five minutes, without voters or election officials being aware of it. This led The Netherlands to ban electronic voting machines in elections.
The main argument against voting machines is that from the time of development and installation to transfer of data to a central repository for tallying, too many persons have access to the machines. This makes them prone to tampering by installing new software, which could ensure a pre-determined outcome. Experts Hari K Prasad, J Alex Halderman and Rop Gonggrijp have proved how EVMs can be hacked. One method is by replacing a small part of the machine with a look-alike component that can be silently instructed to steal a percentage of the votes in favour of a chosen candidate; these instructions can be sent wirelessly from a mobile phone. Another method is by using a pocket-sized device to change the votes stored in the EVM between the election and the public counting session. Both methods are difficult to detect.
Surprisingly, the Election Commission has been aware of these dangers since 2000. The then Chief Election Commissioner MS Gill had asked experts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard University to prove the insecurity of EVM chips. Despite some changes, the EVMs remained prone to hacking. The Supreme Court in 2004 asked the Election Commission to consider the technical flaws in EVMs noted by Satinath Choudhary, a US-based software engineer. But nothing happened. However, in 2010, the EC set up an expert technical committee headed by former IIT-Chennai director PV Indiresan to look at the technical feasibility of introducing a voter-verifiable paper audit trail.
As of now, the existing system is likely to continue in the elections to five States in November 2013. Activists say that in the existing national scenario, where single parties are unlikely to win a clear majority, a minor manipulation of less than 5 per cent of the vote in select constituencies could tip the outcome of the election. Dr Subramanian Swamy's petition on the subject is expected to come up for hearing before the Supreme Court on August 22, 2013.
The clinching argument, however, relates to AIADMK candidate Raja Kannappan (Sivaganga), who was leading by a comfortable margin when counting of votes ended around noon, in May 2009. His rival, P Chidambaram, congratulated him and left the counting station. But when results across the country showed that the United Progressive Alliance would form the Government, Chidambaram returned to the counting centre, a few hours later and demanded a recount. He was declared elected by a margin of 3,354 votes! A few have been able to understand or appreciate the 'system' by which this happened.
S. Kalyanaraman
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