The standard practice I follow is leave the column of payee blank...which the public authority themselves write(hopefully). Till date none of my applications have been rejected for leaving the name of payee blank...but some day a well meaning PIO may want to adopt tactical methods of delay by citing this reason also.
Rejecting the PO of higher amount is only a ploy to delay the information and nothing else, especially if one is not claiming refund. I remember a case, where, my PO was rejected by PIO of Bombay High Court when they used to have fees of Rs. 12 and it was difficult to find PO of Rs. 2/-, so I sent PO of Rs. 15/- and he rejected the same.
Regards.
Girish Mittal
On 5 July 2012 22:31, <HumJanenge@googlegroups.com> wrote:
Group: http://groups.google.com/group/HumJanenge/topics
- UNJUST REJECTION OF RTI APPLICATION ! [6 Updates]
- Henderson Bhagat Report [1 Update]
Hari Goyal <haridgoyal@hotmail.com> Jul 04 03:38PM
For the information of all the activists,
Yes, I agree with Dr. Sandeep Gupta. Even Securities and Exchnage Board of India (SEBI) a Finance Ministry funded
public organisation does not accept RTI application fee is paid if the IPO is addressed to "Pay and Accounts Officer, SEBI".
2. I received a letter from Mr. Aman Jain, Office of the Central Assistant Public Information Officer dated February 15, 2012
that said:
"You may note that the fee of rs. 10/- deposited by you vide IPO No. 92E 315050 is not in order as the same has to be drawn
in favour of "Securities & Exchange Board of India". The IPO No. 92E 315050 is accordingly being returmned."
There are many such examples. So Mr. Sarabjit may like to add to his knowledge.
Hari Goyal
011-25082239
Sandeep gupta <drsandgupta@gmail.com> Jul 04 09:12PM +0530
The ASRB PIO says that when you have already been informed that
payment has to be made in favour of secretary, why are you again
insisting on payment to accounts officer.
as I was more interested in getting information, i sent the IPO again
(in all cases)
--
Dr. Sandeep Kumar Gupta
1722, Sector 14, Hisar-125001, INDIA
Phone: 91-99929-31181
"M.K. Gupta" <mkgupta100@yahoo.co.in> Jul 04 11:49PM +0800
Dear Afzal,
When the IPO of Rs. 10/- is not available in the post office and one is bent upon to send the RTI, he is compelled to send the IPO of higher value, whatever is available, may be Rs. 10, 50 or even 100/-. In the RTI Act, it has nowhere been written that an application can be rejected for sending higher amount. This is only a way to delay or deny the information. Higher amount is also sent when an applicant wants photo copies of documents without any delay or waiting to receive a letter from PIO for sending some more amount because that will delay information from at least one to two months.
I fail to understand reason of your provocation. If a PIO react like this, that is understandable.
________________________________
From: Mohammed Afzal <mohdafzal1963@gmail.com>
To: "humjanenge@googlegroups.com" <humjanenge@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 4 July 2012 10:27 AM
Subject: Re: [HumJanenge] UNJUST REJECTION OF RTI APPLICATION !
Mr Gupta,
The RTI Act 2005 very categorically prescribe the RTI fees I don't see any reason why one should be so generous by afflixing excess amount.
Plz note: 10 other applicants will do things. Not under the preview of the RTI Act and blame the PIO for rejection.
Plz when we say that RTI Act should be implemented in totality, it means that we should be abiding by it as well. Bcoz together we can make a difference.
However it true that applicants across the country sometime leave the IPO blank citing that some Public authorities want RTI fees in favour of _______ . It has been observed that many a times the PIO oblige and accept the IPO with favouring so and so blank. But the point here is that if we insist that PIO should adhere to the RTI Act than we also hv some responsibility to follow.
Plz do not take it personally.
Best Regds - Mohammed Afzal
########################
Sent from my iPhone
On 03-Jul-2012, at 7:31 AM, "M.K. Gupta" <mkgupta100@yahoo.co.in> wrote:
UNJUST
REJECTION OF RTI APPLICATION!
>
>An Appellant sent an RTI
application to Deptt. of Excise, Delhi Govt. enclosing the postal order of Rs. 20/-
instead of Rs. 10/- without filling the payee column. Postal order of higher value was sent to
cover the cost of photocopies of documents, if any, and this fact was mentined
in the RTI application also.
>
>The PIO
has rejected the application on the
grounds of postal order of higher demonition and for leaving the payee column
blank.
>
>Though a fresh RTI
has been sent removing the aforesaid objections but I want to know if any
appeal can be sent to FAA or CIC for rejecting the appln on the above grounds.
Vikram Simha <vikramsimha54@yahoo.co.in> Jul 05 02:52AM +0800
iS IT A "CURABLE DEFECT" ? IF SO AT WHAT STAGE ?
iN KARNATAKA THE IPOs is to be made in favour of IPOs
N vikramsimha , KRIA Katte , #12 Sumeru Sir M N Krishna Rao Road , Basvangudi < Bangalore 560004.
"Ketan Modi" <modiketan@rediffmail.com> Jul 04 07:51PM
The PIO has erred grossly. The statute & rules there under spells out the amount
of minimum fees to be paid by the applicant. If an applicant sends a postal order
of higher denomination, the PIO can treat it either as charity to the government
or fee towards photocopies to be furnished. In the instant case, the applicant had
already mentioned in the application that the higher denomination PO was towards
photo copying. The rejection order is bad in law and the applicant must approach
the FAA with this prayer and seek the documents free of cost with prayer that cost
of photocopying be recovered from the PIO's salary. This will teach him a lesson
of the life time. Happy information seeking.
Ketan Modi
On Thu, 05 Jul 2012 00:08:00 +0530 wrote
> UNJUST
REJECTION OF RTI APPLICATION!
An Appellant sent an RTI
application to Deptt. of Excise, Delhi Govt. enclosing the postal order of Rs.
20/-
instead of Rs. 10/- without filling the payee column. Postal order of higher value
was sent to
cover the cost of photocopies of documents, if any, and this fact was mentined
in the RTI application also.
The PIO
has rejected the application on the
grounds of postal order of higher demonition and for leaving the payee column
blank.
Though a fresh RTI
has been sent removing the aforesaid objections but I want to know if any
appeal can be sent to FAA or CIC for rejecting the appln on the above grounds.
Sarbajit Roy <sroy.mb@gmail.com> Jul 05 07:21PM +0530
Dear Guptaji
1) Nobody is saying that higher amount IPO cannot be sent, or is
invalid merely because it is of a higher amount.
2) What I and Afzal have said is that you cannot send an IPO of a
higher amount and expect the PIO to credit the extra amount towards
further fees to provide the information.
3) The RTI Act lays down the Protocols.
a) File application accompanied by Rs.10 application fee
b) PIO to send a computation of further fees IF information can be disclosed
c) Applicant to remit further fees as demanded
vinay singh <vinay4299@gmail.com> Jul 04 09:16PM +0530
Please read the brief below, which has been handed over to the COAS. The
most telling reason for releasing the HB Report and declassifying military
records of 1962 is the the effect on our defence preparedness.
Maj Gen VK Singh
*DECLASSIFICATION OF MILITARY RECORDS*
Military records of the period after 1961 have still not been
declassified. As a result, they are not available to research scholars or
military training institutions. This is adversely affecting not only the
training of military leaders but also our defence preparedness, especially
with regard to China. The recent developments in this matter are given
below.
The official histories of the Hyderabad Police Action of 1948 and the
Liberation of Goa in 1961 were published History Division of the MOD in
1972 and 1974 respectively. This was followed by the publication in 1987 of
the history of the Jammu & Kashmir operations of 1947-48. The History
Division submitted the official history of the 1971 war to the Government
in 1988, followed by those of the 1962 and 1965 wars in 1990 and 1992
respectively. However, their publication was stopped by the Ministry of
Defence, reportedly at the instance of the Ministry of External Affairs.
In September 2000, *The Times of India* put the 1965 and 1971 histories on
its website with the curt comment: *"Official military histories of the
1962, 1965 and 1971 wars exist, but successive governments, obsessed with
secrecy, have refused to make them public".* Subsequently, the official
histories of 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars were also put on the website of
Bharat Rakshak. The title of each of the three books indicates that it is
the 'Official History' with the copy right held by the History Division,
Ministry of Defence, Government of India. The histories of the 1962 and
1965 wars are graded 'Restricted' while that of 1971 does not bear any
security classification.
In 2000, based on the Kargil Review Committee report, the Government
constituted a Group of Minister (GOM) on National Security. Among the
various issues considered by the GOM in the Chapter dealing with Management
of Defence was the publication of war histories. The GOM Report stated: * The
**Ministries of Defence and External Affairs may review the issue of
publication of the official histories of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965
and 1971 Indo-Pak wars and a history of the Indian Peace Keeping Force
(IPKF) operations and finalise the decision within a period of three
months. *
In accordance with the recommendations of the GOM, the Ministry of
Defence constituted
a committee to formulate recommendations on publishing the histories of the
1962, 1965 and 1971 wars. The committee was headed by ex defence secretary N.N.
Vohra, the other two members being Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar and
historian S.N. Prasad. The Committee recommended that the three war
histories should be published. However, the Ministry of External Affairs
again raised objections, raising fears about China's sensibilities.
On 26 November 2007, replying a question on the publication of
the war histories, Defence Minister AK Antony told parliament, *"A
committee to review the publication of war histories, constituted by the
Government, has given its recommendations. The recommendations of the
committee are being considered for arriving at a final decision on the
issue."* This was five years after the committee had submitted its
recommendations. Another five years have gone by, with no progress on the
issue.
In 2011, a book titled *The India Pakistan War of 1965 – A History *was
published by* *Natraj Publishers, Dehradun. The book is a verbatim
reproduction of the official 1965 history produced by the History Division
in 1992, which is available on the website of Bharat Rakshak. There are
some cosmetic changes – the Foreword written by the N.N. Vohra and the
Preface written by S.N. Prasad has been omitted, as also the name of the
author, Dr. B.C Chakravorty. Instead, S.N. Prasad is shown as the 'Chief
Editor' and U.P. Thapliyal as the 'General Editor'. The text and appendices
are exactly the same as in the original book. The copyright is still in the
name of the Ministry of Defence.
Strangely enough, the new book contains references to classified material
which were not cited even in the original book. The Notes and References at
the end of each chapter list a large number of official documents,
including JIC papers and war diaries of formations and units, which were
earlier not cited or mentioned only as 'official records'. How did this
happen? Apparently, fed up with the delay in publication of the 'official
history' on which they had worked so hard, the concerned officials in the
History Division prevailed on the MOD to declassify certain documents. This
was done by a board of officers, which comprised one representative each
from the History Division, and the directorates of Military Operations and
Military Intelligence. The board was asked to examine only the documents
that were intended to be cited for production of the 1965 war history in
printed form. This was promptly done in 2005. As a result, the book was
published in 2011, without any hitch. Similar boards have been conducted
for documents pertaining to the 1962 and 1971 wars.
The paranoia about the 1962 war is not confined to the official
history. Of late, it is even being applied to regimental histories, which
are published by respective regimental officers associations or regimental
centres. In most cases, the author is a retired officer from the regiment,
who is given access to regimental records, secretarial assistance and a
suitable honorarium. According to the latest guidelines, the draft
regimental history is submitted to the military intelligence (MI)
directorate of Army HQ for clearance. If operations are described, it is
sent to the military operations (MO) directorate. In keeping with the
decision of the Ministry of Defence not to declassify war records of 1962,
1965 and 1971, the regimental history is cleared for publication with the
security classification 'Restricted' or 'Confidential'. As a result,
veterans who have taken part in these wars cannot purchase copies. In fact,
even the author cannot keep a copy! As far as the 1962 war is concerned, it
is to be omitted altogether. If one goes by these guidelines, the Indian
Army did not fight any war in 1962!
Interestingly, the Indian Navy follows a system different form the Indian
Army. Instead of the history being screened by Naval Intelligence, it is
cleared by a board of admirals, constituted by the Vice Chief of Naval
Staff. As a result, several volumes of the history of the Indian Navy
authored by a retired officer have been published, including one that
covers the 1965 and 1971 wars, not to speak of several sensitive warship
development projects. Surely, the operations of land forces cannot be
considered classified, when those of naval forces are not, during the same
period or in the same war or conflict.
A recent development has highlighted the grave dangers that we are likely
to face, in any future conflict with China. Through the efforts of the
United Service Institution of India (USI), some Chinese accounts of the
1962 war have been translated. An article titled "1962 – Battle of Se La
and Bomdi La" has been published in the October-December 2011 issue of the
prestigious USI Journal, India's oldest journal on defence affairs.
Authored by Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd), the Deputy Director of the
USI, the article clearly brings out that the Chinese had made a deep study
of the battle of Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War of 1950-53, in
which they were pitted against the US Army in conditions similar to what
they had to face in 1962. A comparison of the terrain, force levels and
tactics employed by the Chinese reveals startling similarities in the two
campaigns. In Korea, by about 25 November 1950 the US 1st Marine Division
had reached the Chosin Reservoir and was poised the final push to the Yalu
River. It was strung along 62 kilometres between Yudam- ni in the north and
Chinhung-ni in the south. Facing the American troops were three Chinese
armies (12 divisions) of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) IX Army Group.
By the morning of 28 November, the Chinese had split the Americans into
three isolated groups at Yudam-ni, Hagaru and Koto-ri.
The situation in NEFA in 1962 was almost a mirror image of the Chosin
Reservoir battle in 1950. After losing the battle of the Thag La Ridge in
October 1962, the 4th Division of the Indian Army withdrew south of Tawang
and concentrated on the axis Se La - Bomdi La, a distance of 61
kilometres. Commencing the second phase of the offensive in mid November,
the Chinese carried out a series of outflanking manoeuvres, splitting the
Indian forces into three pockets, at Se La, Dirang Dzong and Bomdi La. But
the parallel with Korea ends here. In 1950, the Americans were better
equipped and had overwhelming air support. Moreover, they were bubbling
with confidence, conscious of their superiority in men and material. In
1962, the Indians had already lost the first round, and were relatively
demoralized. They had acute shortages of arms, ammunition and clothing.
Most important, artillery support was meagre and air support non –existent,
thanks to a political decision not use the air force, fearing an escalation
of the conflict. The result in both cases was along expected lines. With
the help of air power, the US 1st Marine Division fought through the
Chinese encirclement. It survived as a fighting force, even after suffering
nearly 4400 battle casualties, including 718 dead. In 1962, the Indian
4thDivision was virtually annihilated, suffering 5100 casualties of
all types.
The Chinese reached the Assam plains, before announcing a unilateral cease
fire.
The USI article brings out several other similarities between the two
campaigns and the lessons that should be learnt. Much before the actual
commencement of the hostilities in October 1962, the Chinese had made their
intentions known through subtle signals that Indian diplomats and political
leaders failed to read. These included messages conveyed through the Indian
envoy in Beijing in 1950, K.M. Pannikar and to the Indian Foreign Minister,
Krishna Menon by his Chinese counterpart, Marshal Chen Yi, at Geneva in
July 1962. Incidents at Dhola post and Thagla ridge in June and September
1962 conveyed a similar message, which Indian intelligence officials and
defence planners failed to interpret correctly, with disastrous results. As
the USI article succinctly brings out, recent events in the East and South
China Seas from 2010 onwards have similar portents, which must be read
correctly, to prevent a repetition of the situation that occurred 50 years
ago.
A study of the Chinese documents brings out some startling facts, hitherto
unknown to Indian military planners. The Chinese had been able to make
fairly accurate assessments of Indian forces opposing them in 1962. This
included strength, dispositions, fighting capabilities, morale, critical
shortages in weapons and ammunition and so on. They had also made accurate
profiles of Indian political and military leaders. But the most telling
feature was the tactics which were adopted, based on their experience in
the Korean War 12 years earlier. Against this, the Indian military command
was fighting virtually with its eyes closed. Let alone an accurate
assessment of the Chinese tactics, we had very little knowledge of the
Chinese soldier, his weaponry, morale, logistics etc. This led to the
popular 'human wave' stories of that era, which depicted the Chinese
soldier as a superman who could fight for days and weeks without food or
rest. There is little doubt that Indian military commanders would have
given a better account if they had access to as much information about
their adversary as the Chinese had in 1962.
If and when there is a confrontation between India and China, it will be in
exactly the same place where they fought in 1962 – NEFA (now Arunachal) and
Jammu & Kashmir. Today, there is not a single man in military uniform who
was serving when we fought the last war with China. Battles that took place
during that war – Namka Chu, Se la, Bomdi la, Walong and Rezang La, to
name a few – are not studied by young officers for promotion examinations
or in the training academies, since authentic records such as war dairies
and after action reports are not available to them. By denying Indian
officers the opportunity to study our past campaigns, the government is
inadvertently ensuring that our performance in future wars with China and
Pakistan would not be at optimum levels. Is there any point in increasing
the defence budget and giving modern equipment to the defence services when
we know that they will lose the battle even before it begins? One hopes
that someone in the Ministry of Defence and Army Headquarters realises
grave damage they are doing to our present and future generations of
soldiers, sailors and airmen. Should we send our men to fight and die with
blind folds on their eyes?
*Recommendations*
The Government should permit the publication of the war histories of 1962,
1965 and 1971 wars in printed form. This should be done after a deliberate
decision to declassify all the war records pertaining to these operations
and not selectively as has been done for the 1965 war. According to the
Public Records Act and the Public Records Rules, every records creating
agency is required to evaluate and downgrade the classified records held by
it after every five years. It is also required to submit a bi-annual report
to the Director General of the National Archives on the action taken for
evaluation and downgrading the classified records. This procedure, mandated
by law, is not being followed, a lapse for which the service headquarters,
Ministry of Defence as well as the Director General of the National
Archives cannot escape responsibility. The three service headquarters must
fulfil their part of the bargain, by regularly de-classifying records and
transferring them to the History Division and the National Archives.
There is also a need to review the rules for publication of regimental
histories. Books written by retired officers or civilians do not require
clearance by military intelligence. Of course, if any classified
information is disclosed, the authors face prosecution under the Official
Secrets Act. Regimental histories should also be treated in the same
manner, since they are authored by retired officers and published by
regimental officers associations. There are cases when regimental histories
have been published either without obtaining clearance or ignoring the
instructions of military intelligence to grade them as 'restricted'.
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