Thursday, July 5, 2012

Re: [HumJanenge] Digest for HumJanenge@googlegroups.com - 7 Messages in 2 Topics

 It is sad that PIOs are rejecting the POs for strange reasons.

The standard practice I follow is leave the column of payee blank...which the public authority themselves write(hopefully). Till date none of my applications have been rejected for leaving the name of payee blank...but some day a well meaning PIO may want to adopt tactical methods of delay by citing this reason also.

Rejecting the PO of higher amount is only a ploy to delay the information and nothing else, especially if one is not claiming refund. I remember a case, where, my PO was rejected by PIO of Bombay High Court when they used to have fees of Rs. 12 and it was difficult to find PO of Rs. 2/-, so I sent PO of Rs. 15/- and he rejected the same.

Regards.

Girish Mittal




On 5 July 2012 22:31, <HumJanenge@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Group: http://groups.google.com/group/HumJanenge/topics

    Hari Goyal <haridgoyal@hotmail.com> Jul 04 03:38PM  

    For the information of all the activists,

    Yes, I agree with Dr. Sandeep Gupta. Even Securities and Exchnage Board of India (SEBI) a Finance Ministry funded
    public organisation does not accept RTI application fee is paid if the IPO is addressed to "Pay and Accounts Officer, SEBI".

    2. I received a letter from Mr. Aman Jain, Office of the Central Assistant Public Information Officer dated February 15, 2012
    that said:

    "You may note that the fee of rs. 10/- deposited by you vide IPO No. 92E 315050 is not in order as the same has to be drawn
    in favour of "Securities & Exchange Board of India". The IPO No. 92E 315050 is accordingly being returmned."

    There are many such examples. So Mr. Sarabjit may like to add to his knowledge.

    Hari Goyal
    011-25082239



     

     

    Sandeep gupta <drsandgupta@gmail.com> Jul 04 09:12PM +0530  

    The ASRB PIO says that when you have already been informed that
    payment has to be made in favour of secretary, why are you again
    insisting on payment to accounts officer.
    as I was more interested in getting information, i sent the IPO again
    (in all cases)
     
     
    --
    Dr. Sandeep Kumar Gupta
    1722, Sector 14, Hisar-125001, INDIA
    Phone: 91-99929-31181

     

    "M.K. Gupta" <mkgupta100@yahoo.co.in> Jul 04 11:49PM +0800  

    Dear Afzal,
     
    When the IPO of Rs. 10/- is not available in the post office and one is bent upon to send the RTI, he is compelled to send the IPO of higher value, whatever is available, may be Rs. 10, 50 or even 100/-.  In the RTI Act, it has nowhere been written that an application can be rejected for sending higher amount.  This is only a way to delay or deny the information.  Higher amount is also sent when an applicant wants photo copies of documents without any delay or waiting to receive a letter from PIO for sending some more amount because that will delay information from at least one to two months. 
     
    I fail to understand reason of your provocation.  If a PIO react like this, that is understandable.
     
    ________________________________
    From: Mohammed Afzal <mohdafzal1963@gmail.com>
    To: "humjanenge@googlegroups.com" <humjanenge@googlegroups.com>
    Sent: Wednesday, 4 July 2012 10:27 AM
    Subject: Re: [HumJanenge] UNJUST REJECTION OF RTI APPLICATION !

     
    Mr Gupta,
    The RTI Act 2005 very categorically prescribe the RTI fees I don't see any reason why one should be so generous by afflixing excess amount.
     
    Plz note: 10 other applicants will do things. Not under the preview of the RTI Act and blame the PIO for rejection. 
     
    Plz when we say that RTI Act should be implemented in totality, it means that we should be abiding by it as well. Bcoz together we can make a difference.
     
    However it true that applicants across the country sometime leave the IPO blank citing that some Public authorities want RTI fees in favour of _______ . It has been observed that many a times the PIO oblige and accept the IPO with favouring so and so blank. But the point here is that if we insist that PIO should adhere to the RTI Act than we also hv some responsibility to follow.
     
    Plz do not take it personally. 
     
    Best Regds - Mohammed Afzal
     
    ########################
     
    Sent from my iPhone
     
    On 03-Jul-2012, at 7:31 AM, "M.K. Gupta" <mkgupta100@yahoo.co.in> wrote:
     
     
    UNJUST
    REJECTION OF RTI APPLICATION!

    >An Appellant sent an RTI
    application to Deptt. of Excise, Delhi Govt. enclosing the postal order of Rs. 20/-
    instead of Rs. 10/- without filling the payee column.  Postal order of higher value was sent to
    cover the cost of photocopies of documents, if any, and this fact was mentined
    in the RTI application also.

    >The PIO
    has rejected the application on the
    grounds of postal order of higher demonition and for leaving the payee column
    blank.

    >Though a fresh RTI
    has been sent removing the aforesaid objections but I want to know if any
    appeal can be sent to FAA or CIC for rejecting the appln on the above grounds.

     

    Vikram Simha <vikramsimha54@yahoo.co.in> Jul 05 02:52AM +0800  

    iS IT A "CURABLE DEFECT" ? IF SO AT WHAT STAGE ?
    iN KARNATAKA THE IPOs is to be made in favour of IPOs
    N vikramsimha , KRIA Katte , #12 Sumeru Sir M N Krishna Rao Road , Basvangudi < Bangalore 560004.
     
     

     

    "Ketan Modi" <modiketan@rediffmail.com> Jul 04 07:51PM  

    The PIO has erred grossly. The statute & rules there under spells out the amount
    of minimum fees to be paid by the applicant. If an applicant sends a postal order
    of higher denomination, the PIO can treat it either as charity to the government
    or fee towards photocopies to be furnished. In the instant case, the applicant had
    already mentioned in the application that the higher denomination PO was towards
    photo copying. The rejection order is bad in law and the applicant must approach
    the FAA with this prayer and seek the documents free of cost with prayer that cost
    of photocopying be recovered from the PIO's salary. This will teach him a lesson
    of the life time. Happy information seeking.
    Ketan Modi
     
    On Thu, 05 Jul 2012 00:08:00 +0530 wrote
    > UNJUST
    REJECTION OF RTI APPLICATION!
     
     
     
    An Appellant sent an RTI
    application to Deptt. of Excise, Delhi Govt. enclosing the postal order of Rs.
    20/-
    instead of Rs. 10/- without filling the payee column. Postal order of higher value
    was sent to
    cover the cost of photocopies of documents, if any, and this fact was mentined
    in the RTI application also.
     
     
     
    The PIO
    has rejected the application on the
    grounds of postal order of higher demonition and for leaving the payee column
    blank.
     
     
     
    Though a fresh RTI
    has been sent removing the aforesaid objections but I want to know if any
    appeal can be sent to FAA or CIC for rejecting the appln on the above grounds.

     

    Sarbajit Roy <sroy.mb@gmail.com> Jul 05 07:21PM +0530  

    Dear Guptaji
     
    1) Nobody is saying that higher amount IPO cannot be sent, or is
    invalid merely because it is of a higher amount.
     
    2) What I and Afzal have said is that you cannot send an IPO of a
    higher amount and expect the PIO to credit the extra amount towards
    further fees to provide the information.
     
    3) The RTI Act lays down the Protocols.
    a) File application accompanied by Rs.10 application fee
    b) PIO to send a computation of further fees IF information can be disclosed
    c) Applicant to remit further fees as demanded
     
     

     

    vinay singh <vinay4299@gmail.com> Jul 04 09:16PM +0530  

    Please read the brief below, which has been handed over to the COAS. The
    most telling reason for releasing the HB Report and declassifying military
    records of 1962 is the the effect on our defence preparedness.
     
    Maj Gen VK Singh
     
     
    *DECLASSIFICATION OF MILITARY RECORDS*
     
    Military records of the period after 1961 have still not been
    declassified. As a result, they are not available to research scholars or
    military training institutions. This is adversely affecting not only the
    training of military leaders but also our defence preparedness, especially
    with regard to China. The recent developments in this matter are given
    below.
     
    The official histories of the Hyderabad Police Action of 1948 and the
    Liberation of Goa in 1961 were published History Division of the MOD in
    1972 and 1974 respectively. This was followed by the publication in 1987 of
    the history of the Jammu & Kashmir operations of 1947-48. The History
    Division submitted the official history of the 1971 war to the Government
    in 1988, followed by those of the 1962 and 1965 wars in 1990 and 1992
    respectively. However, their publication was stopped by the Ministry of
    Defence, reportedly at the instance of the Ministry of External Affairs.
     
    In September 2000, *The Times of India* put the 1965 and 1971 histories on
    its website with the curt comment: *"Official military histories of the
    1962, 1965 and 1971 wars exist, but successive governments, obsessed with
    secrecy, have refused to make them public".* Subsequently, the official
    histories of 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars were also put on the website of
    Bharat Rakshak. The title of each of the three books indicates that it is
    the 'Official History' with the copy right held by the History Division,
    Ministry of Defence, Government of India. The histories of the 1962 and
    1965 wars are graded 'Restricted' while that of 1971 does not bear any
    security classification.
     
    In 2000, based on the Kargil Review Committee report, the Government
    constituted a Group of Minister (GOM) on National Security. Among the
    various issues considered by the GOM in the Chapter dealing with Management
    of Defence was the publication of war histories. The GOM Report stated: * The
    **Ministries of Defence and External Affairs may review the issue of
    publication of the official histories of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965
    and 1971 Indo-Pak wars and a history of the Indian Peace Keeping Force
    (IPKF) operations and finalise the decision within a period of three
    months. *
     
     
     
    In accordance with the recommendations of the GOM, the Ministry of
    Defence constituted
    a committee to formulate recommendations on publishing the histories of the
    1962, 1965 and 1971 wars. The committee was headed by ex defence secretary N.N.
    Vohra, the other two members being Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar and
    historian S.N. Prasad. The Committee recommended that the three war
    histories should be published. However, the Ministry of External Affairs
    again raised objections, raising fears about China's sensibilities.
     
     
     
    On 26 November 2007, replying a question on the publication of
    the war histories, Defence Minister AK Antony told parliament, *"A
    committee to review the publication of war histories, constituted by the
    Government, has given its recommendations. The recommendations of the
    committee are being considered for arriving at a final decision on the
    issue."* This was five years after the committee had submitted its
    recommendations. Another five years have gone by, with no progress on the
    issue.
     
    In 2011, a book titled *The India Pakistan War of 1965 – A History *was
    published by* *Natraj Publishers, Dehradun. The book is a verbatim
    reproduction of the official 1965 history produced by the History Division
    in 1992, which is available on the website of Bharat Rakshak. There are
    some cosmetic changes – the Foreword written by the N.N. Vohra and the
    Preface written by S.N. Prasad has been omitted, as also the name of the
    author, Dr. B.C Chakravorty. Instead, S.N. Prasad is shown as the 'Chief
    Editor' and U.P. Thapliyal as the 'General Editor'. The text and appendices
    are exactly the same as in the original book. The copyright is still in the
    name of the Ministry of Defence.
     
    Strangely enough, the new book contains references to classified material
    which were not cited even in the original book. The Notes and References at
    the end of each chapter list a large number of official documents,
    including JIC papers and war diaries of formations and units, which were
    earlier not cited or mentioned only as 'official records'. How did this
    happen? Apparently, fed up with the delay in publication of the 'official
    history' on which they had worked so hard, the concerned officials in the
    History Division prevailed on the MOD to declassify certain documents. This
    was done by a board of officers, which comprised one representative each
    from the History Division, and the directorates of Military Operations and
    Military Intelligence. The board was asked to examine only the documents
    that were intended to be cited for production of the 1965 war history in
    printed form. This was promptly done in 2005. As a result, the book was
    published in 2011, without any hitch. Similar boards have been conducted
    for documents pertaining to the 1962 and 1971 wars.
     
    The paranoia about the 1962 war is not confined to the official
    history. Of late, it is even being applied to regimental histories, which
    are published by respective regimental officers associations or regimental
    centres. In most cases, the author is a retired officer from the regiment,
    who is given access to regimental records, secretarial assistance and a
    suitable honorarium. According to the latest guidelines, the draft
    regimental history is submitted to the military intelligence (MI)
    directorate of Army HQ for clearance. If operations are described, it is
    sent to the military operations (MO) directorate. In keeping with the
    decision of the Ministry of Defence not to declassify war records of 1962,
    1965 and 1971, the regimental history is cleared for publication with the
    security classification 'Restricted' or 'Confidential'. As a result,
    veterans who have taken part in these wars cannot purchase copies. In fact,
    even the author cannot keep a copy! As far as the 1962 war is concerned, it
    is to be omitted altogether. If one goes by these guidelines, the Indian
    Army did not fight any war in 1962!
     
    Interestingly, the Indian Navy follows a system different form the Indian
    Army. Instead of the history being screened by Naval Intelligence, it is
    cleared by a board of admirals, constituted by the Vice Chief of Naval
    Staff. As a result, several volumes of the history of the Indian Navy
    authored by a retired officer have been published, including one that
    covers the 1965 and 1971 wars, not to speak of several sensitive warship
    development projects. Surely, the operations of land forces cannot be
    considered classified, when those of naval forces are not, during the same
    period or in the same war or conflict.
     
    A recent development has highlighted the grave dangers that we are likely
    to face, in any future conflict with China. Through the efforts of the
    United Service Institution of India (USI), some Chinese accounts of the
    1962 war have been translated. An article titled "1962 – Battle of Se La
    and Bomdi La" has been published in the October-December 2011 issue of the
    prestigious USI Journal, India's oldest journal on defence affairs.
    Authored by Major General PJS Sandhu (Retd), the Deputy Director of the
    USI, the article clearly brings out that the Chinese had made a deep study
    of the battle of Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War of 1950-53, in
    which they were pitted against the US Army in conditions similar to what
    they had to face in 1962. A comparison of the terrain, force levels and
    tactics employed by the Chinese reveals startling similarities in the two
    campaigns. In Korea, by about 25 November 1950 the US 1st Marine Division
    had reached the Chosin Reservoir and was poised the final push to the Yalu
    River. It was strung along 62 kilometres between Yudam- ni in the north and
    Chinhung-ni in the south. Facing the American troops were three Chinese
    armies (12 divisions) of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) IX Army Group.
    By the morning of 28 November, the Chinese had split the Americans into
    three isolated groups at Yudam-ni, Hagaru and Koto-ri.
     
    The situation in NEFA in 1962 was almost a mirror image of the Chosin
    Reservoir battle in 1950. After losing the battle of the Thag La Ridge in
    October 1962, the 4th Division of the Indian Army withdrew south of Tawang
    and concentrated on the axis Se La - Bomdi La, a distance of 61
    kilometres. Commencing the second phase of the offensive in mid November,
    the Chinese carried out a series of outflanking manoeuvres, splitting the
    Indian forces into three pockets, at Se La, Dirang Dzong and Bomdi La. But
    the parallel with Korea ends here. In 1950, the Americans were better
    equipped and had overwhelming air support. Moreover, they were bubbling
    with confidence, conscious of their superiority in men and material. In
    1962, the Indians had already lost the first round, and were relatively
    demoralized. They had acute shortages of arms, ammunition and clothing.
    Most important, artillery support was meagre and air support non –existent,
    thanks to a political decision not use the air force, fearing an escalation
    of the conflict. The result in both cases was along expected lines. With
    the help of air power, the US 1st Marine Division fought through the
    Chinese encirclement. It survived as a fighting force, even after suffering
    nearly 4400 battle casualties, including 718 dead. In 1962, the Indian
    4thDivision was virtually annihilated, suffering 5100 casualties of
    all types.
    The Chinese reached the Assam plains, before announcing a unilateral cease
    fire.
     
    The USI article brings out several other similarities between the two
    campaigns and the lessons that should be learnt. Much before the actual
    commencement of the hostilities in October 1962, the Chinese had made their
    intentions known through subtle signals that Indian diplomats and political
    leaders failed to read. These included messages conveyed through the Indian
    envoy in Beijing in 1950, K.M. Pannikar and to the Indian Foreign Minister,
    Krishna Menon by his Chinese counterpart, Marshal Chen Yi, at Geneva in
    July 1962. Incidents at Dhola post and Thagla ridge in June and September
    1962 conveyed a similar message, which Indian intelligence officials and
    defence planners failed to interpret correctly, with disastrous results. As
    the USI article succinctly brings out, recent events in the East and South
    China Seas from 2010 onwards have similar portents, which must be read
    correctly, to prevent a repetition of the situation that occurred 50 years
    ago.
     
    A study of the Chinese documents brings out some startling facts, hitherto
    unknown to Indian military planners. The Chinese had been able to make
    fairly accurate assessments of Indian forces opposing them in 1962. This
    included strength, dispositions, fighting capabilities, morale, critical
    shortages in weapons and ammunition and so on. They had also made accurate
    profiles of Indian political and military leaders. But the most telling
    feature was the tactics which were adopted, based on their experience in
    the Korean War 12 years earlier. Against this, the Indian military command
    was fighting virtually with its eyes closed. Let alone an accurate
    assessment of the Chinese tactics, we had very little knowledge of the
    Chinese soldier, his weaponry, morale, logistics etc. This led to the
    popular 'human wave' stories of that era, which depicted the Chinese
    soldier as a superman who could fight for days and weeks without food or
    rest. There is little doubt that Indian military commanders would have
    given a better account if they had access to as much information about
    their adversary as the Chinese had in 1962.
     
    If and when there is a confrontation between India and China, it will be in
    exactly the same place where they fought in 1962 – NEFA (now Arunachal) and
    Jammu & Kashmir. Today, there is not a single man in military uniform who
    was serving when we fought the last war with China. Battles that took place
    during that war – Namka Chu, Se la, Bomdi la, Walong and Rezang La, to
    name a few – are not studied by young officers for promotion examinations
    or in the training academies, since authentic records such as war dairies
    and after action reports are not available to them. By denying Indian
    officers the opportunity to study our past campaigns, the government is
    inadvertently ensuring that our performance in future wars with China and
    Pakistan would not be at optimum levels. Is there any point in increasing
    the defence budget and giving modern equipment to the defence services when
    we know that they will lose the battle even before it begins? One hopes
    that someone in the Ministry of Defence and Army Headquarters realises
    grave damage they are doing to our present and future generations of
    soldiers, sailors and airmen. Should we send our men to fight and die with
    blind folds on their eyes?
     
    *Recommendations*
     
    The Government should permit the publication of the war histories of 1962,
    1965 and 1971 wars in printed form. This should be done after a deliberate
    decision to declassify all the war records pertaining to these operations
    and not selectively as has been done for the 1965 war. According to the
    Public Records Act and the Public Records Rules, every records creating
    agency is required to evaluate and downgrade the classified records held by
    it after every five years. It is also required to submit a bi-annual report
    to the Director General of the National Archives on the action taken for
    evaluation and downgrading the classified records. This procedure, mandated
    by law, is not being followed, a lapse for which the service headquarters,
    Ministry of Defence as well as the Director General of the National
    Archives cannot escape responsibility. The three service headquarters must
    fulfil their part of the bargain, by regularly de-classifying records and
    transferring them to the History Division and the National Archives.
     
     
     
    There is also a need to review the rules for publication of regimental
    histories. Books written by retired officers or civilians do not require
    clearance by military intelligence. Of course, if any classified
    information is disclosed, the authors face prosecution under the Official
    Secrets Act. Regimental histories should also be treated in the same
    manner, since they are authored by retired officers and published by
    regimental officers associations. There are cases when regimental histories
    have been published either without obtaining clearance or ignoring the
    instructions of military intelligence to grade them as 'restricted'.
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

     

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